



**MONTENEGRO
GOVERNMENT OF MONTENEGRO
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
POLICE DIRECTORATE**

Mid-Term SOCTA Review 2015

**Supplement to the Serious and Organised
Crime Threat Assessment of Montenegro**

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CONTENT

Foreword	3
INTRODUCTION	4
1. Key conclusions	6
2. Areas of crime	7
2.1. Drugs	7
2.2. Illegal migrations and human trafficking.....	10
2.3. Smuggling of excise goods	12
2.4. Loansharking	13
2.5. High-level corruption	14
2.6. Firearms	14
2.7. Emergence of new threats.....	15
2.7.1. Terrorism and religious extremism.....	15
2.7.2. Motorcycle gangs.....	16
3. Organised criminal groups	17
4. Recommended priorities	18

Foreword

The Working Team for the Preparation of Strategic Documents of the Police Directorate of Montenegro presents the Mid-Term Review of the Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment of Montenegro for 2015.

This report supplements the document *Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment of Montenegro (MNE SOCTA 2013)*, published in early 2014, and gives a general overview of key changes in the field of serious and organised crime over the past two years.

The earlier SOCTA report and the present Mid-Term Review aim to provide information to all law enforcement agencies in Montenegro, decision makers at the strategic and operational levels and the wider public, helping them determine priorities in the struggle against serious and organised crime, including the development of multi-year strategic and annual operational plans in priority areas. Determining joint priorities represents a single framework for inter-institutional cooperation and efficient coordination of efforts of all national law enforcement agencies in fighting serious and organised crime.

We are confident that the Mid-Term SOCTA Review and continuous work of the Police Directorate on implementation of the “intelligence led policing” model at the national level in Montenegro, as well as taking concrete intelligence and operational activities, will give a significant contribution to the joint struggle against serious and organised crime, both through inter-institutional cooperation in Montenegro and international cooperation with all our partners in the European Union (EU) and beyond.

We wish to thank all our foreign partners from the neighbouring countries and the EU, particularly the OSCE, including experts and colleagues from EUROPOL, who helped, within our joint projects, strengthen the capacities for strategic analysis.

Working Team for the
Preparation of Strategic
Documents of the
Police Directorate

INTRODUCTION

Serious and organised crime still poses a significant threat to Montenegro and its citizens. Organised criminal groups are highly adaptable to fast changes in legal and illegal markets, and are highly skilful in exploiting possibilities offered by the new technologies, transport infrastructure and the elimination of barriers to the movement of people, goods and capital, both in the real and virtual world, which is why they represent a special challenge for law enforcement agencies.

Fighting serious and organised crime entails a change in the approach of law enforcement agencies to tackling this issue, with a special focus on stronger coordination of joint efforts of inter-institutional cooperation of authorities and further linking with all other segments of the society as a whole.

Intelligence led policing (ILP)

For a number of years already, the Police Directorate of Montenegro has been committed to a strategic solution to this issue and development of the ILP model. As a result, through numerous projects and cooperation with foreign partners, we have developed an entirely new criminal-intelligence segment of police operations, which can produce strategic, tactical and operational documents needed to law enforcement agencies in Montenegro, following methodologies applied in EU countries.

Determining priorities in the field of serious and organised crime

In accordance with its national ILP model and within the reform of the prioritisation policy arising from SOCTA, in 2014 the Police Directorate of Montenegro took a number of concrete steps to harmonise the cycle of fighting serious and organised crime with steps envisaged by the EU policy cycle.

In March 2014, SOCTA 2013 for Montenegro was published, listing recommendations based on the analysis of major threats. In August 2014, focusing on issues defined by the SOCTA document, the Managing Group of managers of the Criminal Police Department determined priority areas and prepared the “Action Plan for the Fight Against Serious and Organised Crime for 2014–2015” as a framework for taking concrete intelligence and operational-investigative police activities in order to tackle major issues. The Director of the Police Directorate of Montenegro approved the Action Plan in August 2014. As part of the Action Plan, long-term projects were launched for each of the eight priority areas of the fight against serious and organised crime, as follows: organised criminal groups, narcotic drugs – cocaine and heroin, illegal migrations and human trafficking, excise goods – cigarettes, robberies, loansharking and high-level corruption.

The purpose of this Mid-Term Review is to supplement, after two years, the earlier SOCTA, with a focus on key changes in priority areas in the past period, and to propose to national authorities possible harmonisation of the existing and setting of new priorities for the second half of the four-year cycle of 2016–2017. In early 2017, a new, complete SOCTA will be prepared, marking the start of the new four-year cycle of implementation of activities in the fight against serious and organised crime.

National intelligence model of prioritisation, management and allocation of tasks

Until late 2014, the ILP model was being developed exclusively within the Police Directorate of Montenegro. Later, while preparing and implementing measures from the

Action Plan for the Negotiation Chapter 24 within the EU accession process, the Ministry of Interior and Police Directorate initiated a new direction in development of the ILP model, this time at the national level. In early 2015, as the first step towards establishing a single national intelligence model of prioritisation in Montenegro, based on the SOCTA report, the Bureau for Operational Coordination of the Work of Security Services set up the National Inter-Institutional Operational Team for the Fight Against Serious and Organised Crime, consisting of representatives of the Police Directorate from operational units of the criminal and border police, Customs Administration, Tax Administration, Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, National Security Agency, Prosecution and Ministry of Justice.

The National Team is in charge of preparing proposals for joint national priorities, strategic objectives and multi-annual strategic plans in the fight against serious and organised crime on the basis of the SOCTA report, including the adoption and implementation of annual operational plans in priority areas, along with inter-institutional coordination of specific activities at the operational level.

The National Security Council and Bureau for Operational Coordination – set up in 2014 in accordance with the Law on Bases of the Intelligence and Security Sector in Montenegro, are in charge of decision making on the determination of priorities and objectives, and adoption of proposed plans.

In this way, Montenegro plans, starting from 2016, to fully harmonise the cycle of fighting serious and organised crime with steps and dynamics envisaged by the EU policy cycle.

Mid-Term SOCTA Review

In accordance with needs of decision makers in the field of fighting serious and organised crime, the Mid-Term Review supplements the earlier SOCTA and gives proposals for the harmonisation of priorities. It follows the same methodology and structure as SOCTA, with the difference that it focuses only on changes in trends and assessment of recommendations, and not on a thorough overview of all intelligence information on the situation in the field of serious and organised crime.

The first chapter of the Mid-Term Review contains a brief overview of key conclusions regarding the most important areas, with an emphasis on particular crime-relevant factors. The second chapter presents the key changes in the main fields of crime and development of particular phenomena, including the emergence of new threats, notably in regard to potential threats of terrorism. The third chapter is devoted to specificities of organised criminal groups, while the last, fourth chapter contains proposals of priorities in the fight against serious and organised crime for the next two-year period.

1. Key conclusions

Smuggling and trafficking of narcotic drugs remains the dominant criminal activity of the largest number of registered organised criminal groups, owing to which they make profit worth tens of million of euros per annum.

Illegal migrations through the territory of Montenegro are still marked by the dominant illegal movement of “asylum seekers” from Afro-Asian countries towards EU countries. The abuse of asylum procedures is still the main mode used by illegal migrants – “false asylum seekers” to cross the territory of Montenegro.

The issue of cigarette smuggling through the Montenegrin territory has become increasingly pronounced recently. In this context, the Bar Port is becoming one of the main transit points for cigarette smuggling.

Loansharking has been recognised as one of the priority and growing problems in Montenegro. What lends special weight to this issue is that unresolved relations between usurers and debtors most often give rise to numerous other criminal offences, primarily blood crimes with elements of violence, arson or planting of explosives, threats, extortions, blackmails or kidnapping.

Organised criminal groups are motivated to use corruption or the exchange of other services as part of their strategy to facilitate their concrete criminal activities or the collection of information, usually focusing on lower-ranking civil servants (without the status of public officials) so that they, sometimes even unaware of the full scope of the criminal activity going on in the background, directly help, with their action or the failure to act, in the implementation of specific activities of members of organised criminal groups.

The Balkan region is currently hit by one of the greatest threats manifested in the increase and strengthening of radical extremism, which certainly represents a real threat to the security and interests of Montenegro.

2. Areas of crime

2.1. Drugs

Smuggling and trafficking of narcotic drugs remains the dominant criminal activity of the largest number of registered organised criminal groups, owing to which they make profit worth tens of million of euros per annum.

Heroin

Judging by the quality and quantity of the heroin seized in Montenegro, its purpose was street sale and not further smuggling towards EU countries. Organised crime focuses on the domestic heroin market, rather than on international smuggling, which directly affects the social-economic aspect of society.

Kosovo remains the central point on the “Balkan route” as the central and southern directions of the route cross there. Heroin is stockpiled in Kosovo – depending on demand, it is returned to the north towards Central Europe or to the south through Albania for Italy.

What remains of key importance for heroin smuggling towards Montenegro is the area around Peć in Kosovo, wherefrom heroin is smuggled, via the channel through the north of Montenegro, towards the central and southern area of the country, mainly for needs of the domestic market.

The second direction of heroin entry into Montenegro is from the Shkoder area in Albania. The heroin smuggled into Montenegro through this route is not intended for the domestic market only, but also for further smuggling towards Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.

Common ethnic origin remains the dominant cohesive factor for organised criminal groups dealing with heroin smuggling, which particularly reflects on relations with countries considered the main suppliers of heroin. No significant changes have been observed in regard to the price, as indicated by the wholesale price and the price intended for street distribution which has not changed.

Cocaine

No significant changes in method have been recorded for cocaine smuggling. The main mode remain container ships of the MSC company, covering the South America – Western Europe line. An increase has been noted in the trend of dropping cocaine packages into the open sea; these packages are later taken by members of organised criminal groups and are smuggled further, usually on smaller yachts.

What has been observed as particularly important are more intensive activities of organised criminal groups, manifested in an increasing engagement and a higher number of sailors from Montenegro, particularly younger persons, who participate in the international smuggling chain.

The recent developments on the international smuggling arena show that members of organised criminal groups from Montenegro, jointly with their partners from countries of the region, increasingly manage to control almost all phases in the smuggling chain.

Although a significant quantity of cocaine was seized in the Bar Port in 2014, that port is not a frequent transit point in the smuggling chain. What poses a special risk for smugglers is the fact that the percentage of containers inspected in the Bar Port is considerably higher (around 12%) than in other European ports (around 2–4%) which are considered the main points of cocaine entry into EU countries.

Activities taken in the past period have resulted in the arrest of a particular number of leaders and high-ranked members of organised criminal groups that deal with cocaine smuggling as their dominant activity. This situation brought about the division of some groups into smaller, mutually opposing groups which independently continued with the implementation of the said activities. The formation of new organised criminal groups in this area may lead to new conflicts and escalation of the existing ones, not only in the territory of Montenegro, but also in countries of the region and some EU countries.

In the period ahead, specialists in property data collection and financial investigations concerning members of organised criminal groups and sailors involved in drug smuggling at the international level should be engaged to a higher degree in investigative activities of law enforcement agencies.

Marijuana

The most significant changes in the field of smuggling of narcotic drugs have been recorded for marijuana. The key factor behind these changes was the police action carried out in the Albanian village of Lazarat, including the seizure of over seven tonnes of marijuana by the Albanian police – which is a record marijuana seizure in Albania in the past five years. As Albania is the main cannabis producer in the region, while Montenegro is the first transit point for its smuggling, these activities significantly impacted on a change in the situation both in the local and international illegal market.

The key changes concern the dynamics of work of domestic and regional organised criminal groups and a changed wholesale price of marijuana. In the second half of 2014, the price of a kilogram of marijuana (wholesale) went up by 100% compared to 2013. The upward trend continues. In 2013, in the border area between Albania and Montenegro (Shkoder lake), the price of a kilogram of marijuana ranged between EUR 500 and 600, depending on the quality, whilst the current price in this region equals at least EUR 1200 for the same quantity. This indicates shrinking marijuana supply in the market – organised criminal groups now face a special challenge reflected in obtaining larger quantities of marijuana and placing it in markets of EU countries at much higher prices. The routes and mode of smuggling remain the same. The key entry points are still legal and illegal crossings at the border between Albania and Montenegro, while exit directions are those at the border crossings towards Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia. In the prior period, the trend of marijuana smuggling via the Bar Port has not increased.

What may emerge as new threats in the coming period are the appearance of marijuana cultivating laboratories and smaller plantations for marijuana cultivation in rural areas of Montenegro.

Synthetic drugs

The trend of appearance of new psychoactive substances in the territory of Europe does not bypass Montenegro either, though it is not possible to conclude with certainty that the coming period will see an increase in the number of domicile users of synthetic drugs.

The year 2014 experienced an upward trend in seizures and a multiple increase in the percentage of users of synthetic drugs (mainly ecstasy and speed) during the summer tourist season, when a greater number of electronic music festivals are organised in Montenegro, which are conducive to the distribution of these types of drugs.


No case of a synthetic drug laboratory has been recorded in Montenegro in the past period.

A special danger is reflected in the fact that a new psychoactive substance (25B-NBOMe) – not included in the list of forbidden substances, was recorded in Montenegro in 2014.


2.2. Illegal migrations and human trafficking

Illegal migrations through the territory of Montenegro are still marked by dominant illegal movement of “asylum seekers” originating from Afro-Asian countries, towards EU countries. The abuse of asylum procedures remains the main method used by illegal migrants – “false asylum seekers” to cross the territory of Montenegro.

According to data of the Ministry of Interior of Montenegro, of total 9192 asylum applications submitted from 2007 to May 2015, protection was granted only for 14 persons. In the majority of other cases, the asylum procedure is suspended as asylum seekers do not respond to the invitation to give statements on circumstances of leaving their countries of origin since they leave the Montenegrin territory within several days.



The main changes are recorded for countries of origin of illegal migrants, i.e. asylum seekers in Montenegro. Over the last two years, there has been a significant reduction in the number of asylum seekers from Pakistan, Algeria, Morocco and Afghanistan, while the strongest increase was seen for persons from Syria, followed by persons from Somalia and Congo to a somewhat lesser extent.



The transit route of these “false asylum seekers” usually goes from Albania through Montenegro towards Serbia, and further towards Hungary and other EU countries. The entry point from Albania to Montenegro is the area around the border crossing of Božaj and further towards Podgorica where, after submitting asylum applications, “false asylum seekers” stay in the Spuž reception centre for several days, whereafter they continue towards Rožaj, in whose vicinity they illegally cross the border with Serbia, most often around the crossing of Dračenovac.

Within investigations conducted by the Montenegrin police in the past period, several organised groups of smugglers were detected and processed. These smugglers enabled illegal crossing of the state border to “false asylum seekers” and organised transportation through the Montenegrin territory. Although the detected groups of smugglers were not formed as permanent organised criminal groups registered in Montenegro, but as *ad hoc* mixed structures of Montenegrin citizens and foreign citizens originating from the same countries as “false asylum seekers”, these groups have a clear division of roles. Foreign citizens who are part of smuggling groups are usually tasked with organising the arrival of migrants, even up to 40 persons, from Greece, through Albania up to the Montenegrin border, including further movement of migrants through the Serbian territory up to Hungary. Montenegrin citizens as members of smuggling groups are usually in charge of taking over migrants coming from Albania, their transportation to the north of Montenegro and organisation of smuggling through the state border towards Serbia. Some members have special duties to transfer money and pay Montenegrin citizens involved in smuggling activities.


2.3. Smuggling of excise goods

The Bar Port is becoming one of the main transit points for cigarette smuggling through the territory of Montenegro.

In terms of cigarette smuggling at the international level, three routes may be singled out. What is characteristic for all three routes is that cigarettes are transported to Montenegro through the Bar Port. Freight trucks are used for further smuggling through the Montenegrin territory towards final destinations (EU countries). The cigarettes usually have false excise stamps and their transport is usually carried out with falsified documents.

The issue of cigarette smuggling through the Montenegrin territory has become increasingly pronounced recently. In terms of smuggling routes, the Bar Port takes a particularly prominent role, as indicated by the latest seizures of great quantities of cigarettes.

The case of smuggling legally produced cigarettes in Montenegro was also recorded – through the Bar Port towards Greece, where a large quantity of cigarettes was seized.



In some cases, cigarette smuggling towards the Republic of Italy was also recorded, through passengers and crew members of the “Sveti Stefan” ferry which operates on the Bar-Bari line. Some indications show that the cigarettes are bought in duty free shops in the free zone of the Bar Port. Cigarettes are smuggled usually with the help of drivers of trucks which are not suspected of being used for the said activities. According to some assessments, smaller quantities of cigarettes are smuggled in such way – these cigarettes usually end up in the black market in Bari.

Through more intensive controls in 2014 and 2015, law enforcement agencies of

Montenegro (notably the Customs Administration and Police Directorate) seized over six million pieces of cigarettes. As the major portion was intended for the Montenegrin market, the cigarettes were distributed across points of sale in almost all Montenegrin towns. These cigarettes are usually without excise stamps at all or have excise stamps from the neighbouring countries such as Serbia, Croatia and Albania. This indicates that Montenegro is not only a transit zone for cigarette smuggling, but also a final destination.

Passenger vehicles, vans and transporters are usually used for smuggling at the regional level.

2.4. Loansharking

Loansharking has been recognised as one of the priority and growing problems in Montenegro. What lends special weight to this issue is that unresolved relations between usurers and debtors most often give rise to numerous other criminal offences, primarily blood crimes with elements of violence, arson or planting of explosives, threats, extortions, blackmails or kidnapping.

Data collected in the past period point to the new phenomenon of “organised loansharking”, with groups of individuals who join capital for the purpose of joint criminal action. In some groups of usurers, the roles of individuals are divided, which has so far been generally the characteristic of organised criminal groups.

The causes of this phenomenon are considered to be links between some usurers with members of the existing organised criminal groups, but also increasingly greater involvement of members of organised criminal groups who invest capital accumulated through primary criminal action (activities relating to drugs or smuggling) at the loansharking interest, thus transferring and introducing the method of work characteristic for organised criminal groups (division of roles) to the field of loansharking.

What has been noticed for some groups of usurers is the establishment of loose structures usually consisting of the core of two–three persons who possess great capital – cash, which they assign to lower-ranked associates – local distributors at a lower rate (5–10%), whereafter lower-ranked associates give directly to citizens smaller amounts at a higher rate (10–20%). The cycle also includes persons who choose victims, i.e. find citizens facing problems and in need of cash, and finally there are persons carrying out violence in the name of a group of usurers, most often in the form of threats and warnings, which may include even the destruction of debtors’ property.

Usurers also engage specialists for the performance of specific tasks such as transport of cash through the state border, or they engage lawyers to conduct all activities starting from the preparation and implementation of contracts for the takeover of debtors’ companies or real estate, up to securing documentation, which is necessary for usurers in the event of court proceedings. These activities may be accompanied by acts of corruption of persons employed in the banking sector, including professional notaries and public executors.

A special problem which significantly aggravates proving of this criminal offence is that the damaged parties, i.e. persons who take money at a loansharking interest do not report on a criminal offence in the majority of cases and do not wish to establish cooperation with law enforcement bodies since they are usually under constant threats and pressure by usurers or persons engaged by usurers to commit violence.

In the coming period, activities should be taken to gain greater trust of persons affected by loansharking or members of their families, encouraging them to report on all criminal offences relating to this phenomenon, and providing them with additional police and legal protection. Besides, citizens should be incited to inform the police in greater numbers, anonymously or in another way which suits them, about loansharking or violence arising from loansharking.

Solving the issue of loansharking should be one of the joint priorities of the police and prosecution in the coming period, with the aim to launch new proactive investigations and

find new ways for easier and more efficient proving not only of the criminal offence of loansharking, but also of the users' role as parties that order criminal offences with elements of violence. At the same time, investigative activities should focus on creating a legal basis for seizing illegally obtained property or profit from processed usurers.

2.5. High-level corruption

Solving the issue of corruption, particularly high-level corruption committed by persons in the capacity of public officials, is set high on the list of priorities by the political level, public sector and international factors involved in euro-Atlantic integration of Montenegro.

Data collected through intelligence work and open-ended investigations did not indicate a link between members of organised criminal groups with corruption directed at public officials. Organised criminal groups are motivated to use corruption or the exchange of other services as part of their strategy to facilitate their concrete criminal activities or the collection of information, usually focusing on lower-ranked civil servants (without the status of public officials) so that they, sometimes even unaware of the full scope of the criminal activity going on in the background, directly help, with their action or the failure to act, in the implementation of specific activities of members of organised criminal groups.

The issue of high-level corruption, committed by public officials, should not be strategically treated as part of the problem concerning activity of organised criminal groups in Montenegro, as there are no concrete operational data showing that this represents a phenomenon or a common method of work, which, however, does not exclude the possibility that individual cases may appear in future.

When tackling high-level corruption, the focus should be placed on treating the issue as an individual act of a public official concerned, aimed at own property gain, during which the official takes one or more actions with corruption features. The proposed priority areas for future research and launching of proactive investigations aimed at detecting high-level corruption are: health care, local self-government, public administration, law enforcement agencies, public procurements and tenders, urbanism (with a special emphasis on spatial planning and infrastructure, including environmental consequences), construction and education.

2.6. Firearms

A significant number of criminal offences in the area of the Western Balkans and mutual clashes among members of organised criminal groups are still carried out with the use of explosives and firearms in illegal ownership, which in the majority of cases originate from the neighbouring countries affected by war.

The period observed in Montenegro saw only individual cases of smuggling smaller quantities of firearms towards EU countries. Cases of organised smuggling of weapons through Montenegro were not recorded. Members of organised criminal groups participated in smuggling only in individual cases.

It is assumed that the riskiest points of entry of firearms into Montenegro are the border area between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, and the border area with Serbia. Risky exit points are the Bar Port and the border area with Kosovo.

2.7. Emergence of new threats

2.7.1. Terrorism and religious extremism

The Balkan region is currently hit by one of the greatest threats manifested in the increase and strengthening of radical extremism, which certainly represents a real threat to the security and interests of Montenegro.

What has been recognised as a potential threat is the participation of citizens of Montenegro and countries of the region in war conflicts organised in Syria and Iraq under the auspices of the ISIL. The recruits are usually younger persons who are directly indoctrinated at gatherings of religious extremist factions and via different social networks, whereby the impact of the ISIL is spread in an organised way to the territory of our country.

The events which have recently unfolded in countries of the region and the EU (the police station of Zvornik, attack in Kumanovo, France etc) clearly indicate the intensification of the impact of extremist forces in the Balkans.

It may be concluded that the Balkan region is currently hit by one of the greatest threats manifested in the increase and strengthening of radical extremism, which certainly represents a real threat to the security and interests of Montenegro. This is also confirmed by the fact that members of the said armed forces from the territory of Montenegro called for spreading of the ISIL influence in these areas as well. What is particularly favourable for them is the strong connection with other followers of the idea who gravitate towards countries of the region.

The recently adopted Law Amending the Criminal Code introduces the criminal offence of “participation in foreign armed formations”, which has created a legal basis for repressive action in such situations. However, what has been recognised as a shortcoming is the fact that so far law enforcement agencies have not had experience in processing and proving of this criminal offence.

As this threat directly jeopardises national interests, special attention is devoted to inter-institutional cooperation and upgrading the exchange of information at the regional and international level.

2.7.2. Motorcycle gangs

No significant influence of organised criminal groups functioning as motorcycle gangs has been recorded so far in the territory of Montenegro. However, there is an evident trend of setting up motorcycle clubs with some indications of motorcycle gangs.

The period ahead may see an increase in the number of members of motorcycle clubs functioning as branches of motorcycle gangs: Outlaws, Bandidos and Hells Angels, which is a trend characteristic for countries of the region for some time already.

2.7.3 Cyber crime

An upward trend of the sale of stolen and falsified goods of various types, most often through popular social networks, has been observed in Montenegro recently.

EU countries have witnessed an upward trend of the sale of narcotic drugs, firearms, falsified documents, and criminal services through “Darknet”.

There is a real danger that the trend of committing criminal offences via the internet (“Darknet”) will spread to Montenegro in terms of the sale of narcotic drugs and firearms, while money transactions would be performed by the bitcoin¹.

¹ Bitcoin is a digital currency used for internet transactions.

3. Organised criminal groups

To obtain illegal property gain, registered organised criminal groups carry out their primary and most important criminal activities in the field of international smuggling of various types of narcotic drugs (cocaine, heroin and marijuana), while secondary criminal activities consist of money laundering and loansharking.

The aim of organised crime is to create profit through illegal operation. Violence recently committed by organised criminal groups is controlled and is implemented as part of their long-term strategy. Violence in the form of threats, intimidation, beating or murders is motivated by unsettled accounts arising from joint criminal activities, taking the leading role in criminal operation in a particular territory or market, including intimidation and disciplining of own members. Restructuring has been observed in highly-ranked organised criminal groups, which may lead to criminal offences that may negatively affect the public and the security situation in Montenegro. This may also contribute to the creation of a negative image of Montenegro as a country with a security risk, which may be particularly observed in the context of Montenegro being a tourist destination.

Some organised criminal groups have restructured their members and have split into smaller, mutually opposing groups, which continued to independently implement earlier initiated criminal activities. In the coming period, such restructuring may represent a threat manifested in the intensification of the existing conflicts.

4. Recommended priorities

Priorities 2013–2014	Recommended priorities 2015–2016
Organised criminal groups	Terrorism and religious extremism
Smuggling narcotic drugs	Smuggling narcotic drugs
Illegal migrations and human trafficking	Illegal migrations
Smuggling excise goods – cigarettes	Serious criminal offences arising from conflicts among organised criminal groups
Loansharking	Loansharking
High-level corruption	Loansharking
Robberies	High-level corruption